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Abstract
We analyse the interdependence between green attitude and equilibrium development
of environmental quality in an endogenous growth model. Individuals take only part
of their impact on pollution into account, hence there is a negative externality of
capital accumulation on environmental quality. Increasing wealth or increasing pollu-
tion enhance green attitude and reduce the externality, because individuals care more
about the environment if their income is higher or if pollution is more obvious. The
time path of pollution as well as the evolution of equilibrium growth are shown to de-
pend crucially on the determinants of green attitude. If green attitude improves with
increasing wealth, e.g. as a consequence of an increase in environmental education,
the economy converges to the sustainable growth path and in the long run, also the
optimal level of environmental quality is realized. In contrast, pollution remains at a
suboptimally high level if individual attitude towards the environment is influenced
by pollution itself, that means, if individuals care the more about environmental issues
the worse environmental quality.
JEL–Classification: O1, O4, Q2, Q5
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1 Introduction
Recent research in various disciplines identifies an increased sensitivity of individuals as
regards environmental problems such as pollution, loss of biodiversity, global warming,
ozone depletion or tropical deforestation. Summarizing this, the European Commission
(2008, p. 3) states within the Special Eurobarometer 295 entitled ’Attitudes of European
Citizens towards the Environment’ that: ". . . citizens are becoming more aware of both
the potential effects of these problems in their daily lives and the role they could play in
protecting their environment." Follow-up studies confirm these preoccupations (see e. g.
European Commission 2011).
In industrialized economies, individual awareness of environmental issues strengthens
over time, e. g. by increasing pollution, environmental education or increasing income.
Hence, perception of environmental degradation is endogenous and as a consequence,
pollution and accumulation dynamics become considerably more complex. Therefore we
focus on the determinants of environmental externalities as well as on their evolution on
the growth path. We show that the properties of dynamic market equilibrium depend
crucially on whether and in which way individual attitude towards the environment is
influenced by economic development. The relevance of pollution perception for the re-
sulting time path of environmental quality was also discussed by Schumacher and Zou
(2008) who show that pollution perception may change the dynamics qualitatively and
lead to intergenerational inequity.
In order to analyse these arguments, we ascribe the environmental externality to par-
tial perception of the individual impact on environmental quality corresponding to partial
rivalry in congestion models, see Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Fisher and Turnovsky
(1998) or Eicher and Turnovsky (2000). Individuals recognize environmental quality to be
influenced in part by themselves and in part by the rest of the society. Consequently, they
only feel partially responsible for the level of pollution, and this partial responsibility may
increase in the process of economic growth. European citizens e. g. are shown to under-
take more environmentally-friendly actions if they are highly educated and well-informed
about the environment (see European Commission 2011, p. 29). Another example is the
rapidly increasing demand for organic products in most industrialized countries.
We distinguish two possible impacts of economic development on green attitude. First,
wealth is an important determinant of individual attitude towards the environment. Richer
nations can spend more on environmental education, richer individuals are able to spend
more for green consumption. Hence green attitude will strengthen with an increase in
wealth. The second determinant we regard is pollution itself. As environmental quality
decreases, individuals will be more concerned with environmental issues and hence care
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more about the environment. For example, directly after the Fukushima nuclear accident a
great majority emerged in favour of a switch to green energy, combined with a noticeable
increase in the willingness to pay.
We analyse the interdependence between green attitude and economic and environmental
development. The individual attitude towards the environment determines the extent of
the negative externality and therefore accumulation and abatement decisions. Capital ac-
cumulation and environmental quality in turn determine the evolution of green attitude.
The resulting dynamics are complex. Pollution level and growth rate may decrease mono-
tonically during the growth process and eventually converge to their optimal levels. But
depending on the characteristics of green attitude adjustment and on the specific level of
environmental quality, capital growth may even result suboptimally low in the transition
process, combined with still suboptimally high pollution. The outcome depends predom-
inantly on the nature of the influence of increasing wealth and environmental quality on
the evolution of green attitude.
Externalities associated with environmental goods are well-known to cause suboptimally
high economic growth in dynamic market equilibrium, at least if pollution is a by-product
of the consumption good. Brock and Taylor (2005) or Xepapadeas (2005) provide com-
prehensive overviews. There is a wide literature on environmental policy in endogenous
growth models, see Stokey (1998) with a focus on tax and voucher schemes, or Grimaud
(1999) and Ono (2002) both analysing pollution permits. More recently, there was a
shift of emphasis on human capital and R&D: Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007) as well
as Pautrel (2012) work on the growth impact of environmental policy in corresponding
endogenous growth settings. Our focus is different. We show that endogenization of envi-
ronmental externalities changes important features of dynamic market equilibrium, which
in turn have do be regarded in order to evaluate environmental policy measures correctly.
After the presentation of the assumptions in Section 2 we analyse the dynamic equilibrium
in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the endogenous determination of green attitude. If
green attitude gains importance throughout the growth process due to increasing wealth
(section 4.1), the equilibrium growth path converges to the sustainable growth path. If
instead increasing pollution is the determinant for individual perception of environmental
quality (section 4.2), we show that the steady state pollution level as well as steady state
growth remain suboptimally high. Section 4.3 explains the complex dynamic structure




2.1 Environmental quality and green attitude
There is evidence that the extent of environmental externalities and free rider behaviour
changes in time. For example, all but 5% of European citizens consider the protection of
the environment as important to them personally (European Commission 2011, question
QB1), as displayed in figure 1(a). Furthermore, a great majority of Europeans think that
the citizens themselves are not doing enough for environmental quality, see figure 1(b).
A usual outcome concerning externalities is that 79%of the respondents think that corpo-
rations and industry should do more to protect the environment. Correspondingly, 72%
(63%) answer that the national governments (the European Union) don’t do enough to
use natural resources efficiently. But astonishingly, 69% of the informants feel that the
individuals themselves should behave more environmentally friendly.
(a) "How important is protect-
ing the environment to you
personally?"; question QB1
(b) "In your opinion, are each of the following currently . . . doing too
much, . . . doing about the right amount, or . . . not doing enough to
use natural resources efficiently?"; question QB17
Figure 1: Green attitude; based on questions in Special Eurobarometer 365, European Commission (2011)
We consider the growth path of an economy in which environmental pollution results
from production of the homogenous consumption good. Environmental damage increases
jointly with an increasing capital stock, K, and decreases with abatement activity, E.1 More
concretely, pollution emerges according to K(t)/E(t). This presentation is based, among
1Due to linear production technology as given in equation (5), the interdependency between pollution and
capital stock is equivalent to pollution out of production.
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others, on Smulders and Gradus (1996) who show within a more general approach that
a sustainable growth path (as represented by a non-increasing level of pollution together
with non-decreasing per-capita income, see e. g. ?, p. 147) may only be achieved if the
pollution elasticity of capital does not exceed the pollution elasticity of environmental
expenditure. We apply this result by assuming identical elasticity that (without a loss of
generality) equals unity.
Green attitude is captured by the parameter δ which indicates that individuals perceive
their influence on pollution only partially. In other words, the individuals do not realize
the entire impact of their economic activity on the resulting pollution level. A related
approach to pollution perception can be found in Schumacher and Zou (2008). The partial
perception induces an external effect which ends up in a suboptimally high equilibrium









, 0≤ δ < 1 (1)
where K and E denote the aggregate levels of capital and expenditure for environmen-
tal protection; k and e are the respective individual variables. Assuming homogeneity of
individuals, the aggregate ratio K/E and the individual ratio k/e coincide, hence in equi-
librium perceived pollution equals actual pollution P(t) = K(t)/E(t). With this respect our
approach to pollution perception differs from the one of Schumacher and Zou (2008). In
our model, individuals are affected by actual pollution. But within utility maximization
they calculate their impact on pollution as given by pollution perception (1).
The parameter δ denotes the share of pollution that is perceived as being exogenous to
the individual’s decision. Thus, δ = 0 reflects the absence of any externality, i. e. the in-
dividuals perceive the entire (negative) impact of their actions on the resulting pollution
level correctly. If, in contrast, δ is close to unity, the individuals perceive their own impact
as atomistic and thus negligible. Thus, an environmental externality arises whenever δ is
positive. Then the influence of individual decisions on environmental quality is underesti-
mated.2 3 An improvement of green attitude hence corresponds to a decline in δ.
In reality, individuals show free rider behaviour, but they don’t exclusively free ride. To
2A related argumentation can be found in Eriksson (2004) who argues that individual preferences for
environmentally friendly goods lead to a partial internalization of externalities.
3Alternatively one might interpret 1−δ as degree of rivalry for environmental pollution. This is analogue to
the presentation of congestion effects in the context of public goods (compare e.g. Edwards 1990, Glomm and
Ravikumar 1994, Turnovsky 2000, chap. 13). Most environmental goods are characterized by partial rivalry,
i.e. they are described by 1> δ > 0. Organic food, e.g., reduces individual pollution loads. This represents a
kind of consumption rivalry. At the same time, the production of organic food also reduces pollution loads of
the entire cultivable land. This benefits the other producers equally, i.e. there is no rivalry.
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some extent they act environmentally friendly. There are several actions the European cit-
izens execute due to environmental reasons, see figure 2. First of all, individuals separate
waste (around 60% of respondents). But they also cut down their energy consumption
(around 50%) and they even use their car less (around 20%) in order to contribute to the
improvement of environmental quality. In the terminology of our assumptions, this means
that the perception parameter δ indeed is below unity. Moreover, the number of European
citizens who act environmentally friendly in order to help towards less pollution increases
in time, as impressively shown in figure 2. Again transferred into our model, this means
that green attitude improves and the perception parameter δ decreases in time.
Figure 2: "Have you done any of the following during the past month for environmental reasons?"; question
QB12, European Commission (2011)
Important determinants of the evolution of green attitude are education and income.
Within the Special Eurobarometer, respondents were asked "As an individual, you can
play a role in protecting the environment in your country?". Individuals estimate their in-
fluence on environmental protection the higher the more educated they are and the higher
their personal income (see European Commission 2011, question QB 14.1, p. 20). With
longer education time individuals know more about the impact of economic decisions on
environmental quality. With increasing aggregate income usually the average education
level enhances, and with increasing individual income people are able to behave more
environmentally friendly. Moreover, people with higher income are more concerned with
environmental problems, as e. g. described by Glaeser (2005). Glaeser emphasizes that
the correlation between GDP and "... viewing global warming as a [personal] threat ...
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could also be explained by a more robust market for ideas in wealthier countries, in that
their citizens feel free to express thoughts and debate issues without fear of repercussions
from the government" (see Glaeser 2005, p. 210).
Another essential factor of individual environmental perception is environmental quality
on its own. As long as the pollution level is low, individuals do not care about the impact
of their actions on environmental quality but only consider their impact on the resulting
consumption path. As pollution increases, the negative impact of capital accumulation
on environmental quality becomes visible and thus fosters environmental awareness of
the individuals. For example, the survey underlying the Eurobarometer 365, (European
Commission 2011) was carried out in april and may 2011, in direct succession of the Gulf
of Mexico oil spill and the Fukushima nuclear accident. As a consequence, man-made
disasters followed by water pollution were mentioned most freqently in 2011 to provoke
the biggest effects of environmental change (see European Commission (2011, p. 14)). As
also described by Schumacher (2009) green attitude will be the more likely if the pollution
level is high. The environmental consequences of economic decisions are more obvious,
hence green attitude will enhance.
In what follows we assume that green attitude is determined by economic development as
well as by the pollution level. The perceived impact of individual activity on environmental
pollution is positively linked to increasing wealth, k. For less developed economies, the
perception parameter δ is high and decreases throughout the growth process. This is a
shortcut for the effort in environmental education, the possibilities for green consumption,
larger freedom of expression and so on. Second, green attitude is positively linked to
increasing pollution, P. Given low pollution levels, P, the perception parameter δ will be
high and decreases with a rise in pollution. Formally spoken, we assume
δ = δ(k,P) with δk < 0,δkk > 0, δP < 0,δPP > 0 (2)
δ(k0,P0)< 1, lim
k→∞




Environmental pollution affects individual decisions as it induces dis-utility. We assume a
continuum of infinitely lived individuals who maximize intertemporal utility. Intertempo-
ral utility, however, might also be interpreted in a model of overlapping generations where
parents are altruistic with respect to their own children — an assumption that is especially
plausible in the context of environmental quality which frequently only becomes prevalent
for subsequent generations.
7









(a) Green attitude determined by wealth,
δ(k, P̄)









(b) Green attitude determined by pollution,
δ(k̄,P)
Figure 3: Evolution of green attitude





The parameter ρ > 0 denotes the rate of time preference. Especially in the context of sus-
tainability, the choice of a positive rate of time preferences has been critically discussed
already by Ramsey (1928, p. 543) who stated that discounting future utility reflects ". . . a
practise which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imag-
ination." The assumption of a positive rate of time preference, however, within this paper
is chosen since we intend to describe the real development of an economy and not a so-
cially desired time path. The assumption of a positive discount rate is also supported by
empirical studies that show that the real rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate
of an economy significantly.
Instantaneous utility, u(c,P), is characterized by a constant intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, ε, as well by an intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and
pollution equal to unity. Notice that both are knife-edge assumptions which reflect nec-
essary preconditions for the existences of a sustainable growth path with a constant level
of pollution (compare e.g. Smulders and Gradus 1996). Thus the intratemporal utility




, 0< ε < 1, γ > 0. (4)
The additional assumption that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has to fall short
of unity results from unequivocal empirical studies (e.g. Hall 1988, Epstein and Zin 1989).
The parameter γ represents the relative impact of dis-utility out of environmental pollu-
tion.
The linear production of the homogenous consumption good is given by
f (k) = Ak, A> 0. (5)
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The only productive input is capital that shall be broadly interpreted to include, e.g. hu-
man capital. In order to focus on environmental externalities, we abstract from further
externalities within consumption good production.
3 Equilibrium growth and environmental quality
3.1 Dynamic optimization
In the following we analyse the dynamic market equilibrium and focus on the implications
of green attitude. The resulting growth rate is unequivocally smaller than in an economy
without pollution, i.e. with clean technology.4 Besides, it is shown that the equilibrium
environmental quality is the lower, the lower is the extent of environmental pollution that
individuals perceive as being the outcome of their own activity. Nevertheless, the dynam-
ics resulting from the interdependence between capital accumulation, green attitude and
pollution result to be more complex.
To determine the growth equilibrium the individual maximizes intertemporal utility sub-







s. t. k̇= Ak−c−e
(6)
The individual decides on consumption, c, abatement activity, e, and on capital accumula-
tion, k. Pollution is perceived according to assumption (1) and green attitude evolves as












































Equalizing (7) and (8) together with the equilibrium feature K/E = k/e leads to the (indi-




4This result is closely related to the assumption of a one-sector economy. If there were, e.g. an additional
sector for human capital that accumulates without pollution, pollution had neither impact on the optimal nor
on the equilibrium growth rate (e.g. Gradus and Smulders 1993)
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The ratio between expenditures in environmental protection, e, and consumption, c is
determined by the environmental preferences, γ, and attitude towards the environment, δ.
The higher the perceived dis-utility out of pollution, the higher are relative abatement
expenditures. This already points up to the central impact of individual perception of
environmental quality: The higher the share δ of environmental quality, which seems to
be the outcome of the aggregate (and thus not being a result of individual behaviour), the
lower is the individually perceived utility out of environmental expenditure and thus the
lower is the corresponding budget invested in environmental protection.
Utilizing λ̇ derived from (7) together with (9) provides the Keynes-Ramsey rule which









Private capital return A is reduced by environmental damage, indicated by abatement
activity γ(1−δ)c/k. Along the equilibrium growth path, the abatement ratio, e/k, and thus
the growth rate of pollution, P̂=−ê/k, are endogenously determined.
Concerning the evolution of environmental quality, one has to bear in mind that follow-
ing (10) abatement activity on the one hand increases with expenditure for consump-
tion goods (both consumption and environmental quality are complementary arguments
within the utility function (4)). On the other hand abatement also increases within the
growth process due to stronger attitude towards the environment.
P̂= k̂− ê= k̂− (̂1−δ)− ĉ (12)
Since green attitude, δ, evolves depending on wealth, k, and environmental quality, P,








Note that both elasticities, ξk and ξP, are negative. Hence, if capital or pollution increase,
(1− δ) will rise, too. This mirrors our assumptions about green attitude: increasing
wealth allows for more environmental education, or more pollution increases environ-
mental awareness, both reducing the part δ of pollution which seems to be unrelated with
individual economic decisions.
As given in the appendix, capital growth results in





















Economic growth and environmental quality hence are dynamically interdependent. In
order to disentangle the various occurring effects, first we analyse the case of exogenous
and constant attitude towards the environment as a reference situation. Subsequently we
show that the impact of wealth on green attitude reduces capital growth and induces an
adjustment towards the sustainable pollution level. Afterwards we focus on the impact of
pollution on green attitude which can be shown to hamper the adjustment towards the
optimal growth path.
3.2 Exogenous attitude towards the environment
If individual attitude towards the environment is exogenously given and constant, δ = δ̄,
the economy will immediately realise steady state growth. It can easily be seen from
equation (10) that with invariant attitude towards the environment (hence δ̄k = δ̄P = 0)
the equilibrium growth path implies that environmental expenditures and consumption
grow at the same and constant rate.5 In this case, the macroeconomic variables all grow
at the same rate thereby leading to constant levels of abatement ratio, e/k, and pollution,
P. The growth rate then just differs from the one in an economy which produces without
pollution, ε(A−ρ), by the term −e/k, or put differently, equilibrium growth is unequivo-
cally smaller if pollution arises: pollution which is linked to capital accumulation reduces
the effective marginal product of capital and thus the economy’s equilibrium growth rate.
Combining abatement activity (10), consumption growth (11) and capital growth (A.2)
allows for the explicit determination of the growth rate and the pollution level
k̂(δ̄) = ĉ(δ̄) =







The more pronounced environmental preferences (i.e. higher γ) the lower is the equilib-
rium growth rate. Pollution induces a dis-utility which reduces capital productivity and
thus also private capital accumulation. This effect is magnified if the perception parame-
ter, δ̄, decreases which implies that a bigger part of pollution is ascribed to individual de-
cisions. The impact of perceived pollution on individual accumulation is captured within
5This is the result of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution which equals unity, as already shown in
Smulders and Gradus (1996).
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the term γ(1− δ̄). Incomplete perception of the impact of individual decisions on the pol-
lution level, i.e. δ̄ > 0, results in a suboptimally high growth rate. Part of the negative
effect of capital accumulation via pollution on intertemporal utility is neglected which
leads to an overestimation of capital productivity. Consequently equilibrium growth is
suboptimally high. Complete knowledge about the relationships between individual and
aggregate dimensions as regards the evolution of pollution (K/E = k/e and thus P= k/e
which is equivalent to the polar case δ = 0) would result in optimal growth and optimal
pollution level








As expected equilibrium growth (16) exceeds optimal growth (18) and equilibrium pollu-
tion (17) exceeds optimal pollution (19) confirming the well-known impact of a negative
externality in capital accumulation on the growth rate in market equilibrium.
Indeed, environmental preferences and the attitude towards the environment jointly in-
fluence the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution as well as the effective rate of
time preference. The effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ε/(1+(1− ε)γ(1−
δ̄)), is lower than ε due to environmental preferences (γ > 0) and due to environmental
awareness (δ̄ < 1). The lower the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the
lower is the growth rate for any given private capital return, A. Additionally, the effective
rate of time preference, (1+γ(1− δ̄))/(1+(1−ε)γ(1− δ̄)), is higher than ρ due to pollution
and the awareness of pollution. This reinforces the growth diminishing impact described
just before.
The suboptimally low level of pollution in dynamic equilibrium could motivate to internal-
ize the pollution externality via a sophisticated tax-transfer-system. Within the provided
framework this could be done e. g. via the implementation of a tax on pollution or capital
returns respectively together with a subsidy on environmental protection. Since in the un-
derlying model the environmental policy measures work in the well-known way we forgo
their analysis here.
However, at the same time this raises the question about the determinants of green at-
titude and it is quite implausible to assume that this characteristic remains constant as
an economy evolves. We will now come back to the assumption that green attitude is
determined by wealth and by pollution as given in (2). Hence dynamics will be more
complex. Equation (10) already shows that with endogenous attitude towards the envi-
ronment the growth rates of abatement, e, and consumption, c, will differ. When green
attitude gains importance, (1− δ) increases and environmental expenditures grow faster
than consumption. Hence, the economy cannot realise steady state immediately.
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The following part analyses the impact of endogenous environmental attitude on aggre-
gate growth and the evolution of the pollution level. In doing so, we explicitly focus on
two different initial points: We begin with a situation in which environmental perception
is solely linked to increased welfare (section 4.1). In section 4.2 we focus on the impact
of pollution on green attitude. Then we combine the arguments in section 4.3.
4 Endogenous green attitute
4.1 Green attitude determined by wealth
In what follows we assume that the individual attitude towards the environment may be
explained by the economic development, i.e. the perceived impact of individual activity
on environmental pollution is positively linked to increasing wealth, k. Concerning the
perception function δ(k) we assume δk < 0 and δkk > 0, with δ(k0) < 1 and limk→∞ δ = 0
(as given in Figure 3(a)). Furthermore, we abstract from any impact of pollution on
environmental awareness, that is δP = ξP = 0.
The evolution of the macroeconomic variables throughout the process of convergence to
the long-run equilibrium may be derived from equations (14) and (15) by setting ξP =
0. Along the equilibrium transition path, the individuals again will choose a constant
consumption ratio. This implies that capital and consumption grow at the same rate.
Environmental expenditure then follow
ê= (̂1−δ)+ k̂ (20)
Since with increasing wealth also a bigger share of pollution is attributed to own individual
decisions (i.e. decreasing δ), environmental awareness and thus the perceived impact of
ongoing capital accumulation on pollution increases. Consequently, the growth rate of
abatement activity exceeds the growth rate of private capital and environmental quality
evolves according to P̂= ξk δ1−δ k̂< 0. A growing economy will thus always be characterized
by a decreasing pollution level since stronger attitude towards the environment (due to
ξk < 0) makes abatement grow faster than the capital stock.


























Compared with capital growth in case of exogenous attitude (16), the effective intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is decreased due to the evolution of green attitude. The
denominator in (21) is larger than in (16), hence equilibrium growth is smaller if increas-
ing wealth strengthens the attitude for the environment. The reason is that abatement
activity increases when individuals’ attitude becomes greener. The increase in the abate-
ment ratio decreases effective capital return as can be seen in the Keynes-Ramsey-rule
(11). The resulting growth effect is twofold: First, as δ decreases, the growth rate of
capital decreases. Additionally, as δ will go on to decrease in all future time increments,
capital accumulation is further reduced. This second argument is displayed by the positive
term marked in the growth rate (21).







(a) small impact of wealth: ξk =−0.2






(b) large impact of wealth: ξk =−0.7
Figure 4: Transitional dynamics: evolution of the growth rate; solid red line: k̂(δ(k)) from (21), dashed
green line: k̂∗ from (18), solid green line: k̂(δ̄) from (16); parameters: ε = 0.05,ρ = 0.05,A= 1.5,γ = 2
Figure 4 displays the evolution of capital growth. First, capital growth is unambiguously
reduced if green attitude is fostered by capital accumulation. During the growth process
green attitude evolves, hence the parameter δ decreases and the negative environmental
externality diminishes. Capital growth decreases in time, as abatement activity increases,
this case is shown in figure 4(a). Nevertheless, figure 4(b) shows that the growth reduction
induced by the impact of wealth on green attitude may even overcompensate the negative
externality with respect to capital accumulation. During the transition process, capital
growth may result suboptimally low, if wealth has a large impact on green attitude. The
growth reduction implied by the continuous decrease in future capital return due to the
perpetually enhancing green attitude is larger than the overaccumulation implied by the
environmental externality. However, the more realistic parameter setting is an only small
impact of wealth on green attitude, corresponding to figure 4(a).
Independent from the magnitude of the impact of wealth on green attitude, the pollution
level is suboptimally high in the transition process. This is a direct consequence of the
negative environmental externality. As long as individuals neglect part of the influence of
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their decisions on pollution (that means δ > 0) pollution will remain too high. With the
improvement of green attitude the deviation declines. The resulting development of the
pollution time path is shown in figure 5.









(a) small impact of wealth: ξk =−0.2









(b) large impact of wealth: ξk =−0.7
Figure 5: Transitional dynamics: adaption of environmental pollution; solid red line: P(δ(k)) from (22),
dashed green line: P∗ from (19); parameters: ε = 0.05,ρ = 0.05,A= 1.5,γ = 2
On the one hand, capital growth directly increases pollution. On the other hand it leads
to an increase in expenditure for environmental protection. Pollution decreases because
abatement activity grows faster than capital. As can be seen in equation (20) growth of
abatement activity differs by the term (̂1−δ)> 0 from capital growth. Due to the change
in green preferences, the growth rate of abatement expenditure exceeds the growth rate
of capital in all time increments, hence pollution diminishes monotonically.
Given ongoing growth of capital, environmental awareness enhances (δk < 0) and the per-
ception parameter finally converges towards zero, limt→∞ δ(k) = 0. As a consequence, all
individuals finally consider the entire impact of their decisions on environmental quality














The resulting level of environmental pollution will thus in the long run fall short of the
equilibrium values presented in the last section with exogenous and constant environ-
mental perception. The underlying reason for the convergence to the optimal values is
that throughout the growth process knowledge and understanding for the relationships
between capital accumulation, environmental protection and environmental quality in-
creases. Of course we have to admit that the convergence towards the optimal growth
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path is due to the assumption that individual responsibility for the environment eventually
will become perfect, hence the negative environmental externality disappears completely.
However, in a more realistic setting the externality will only diminish and not disappear
entirely. Thus capital growth and pollution level will approximate their optimal levels but
the deviation will persist.
To summarize the results derived so far: The economy converges against the sustainable
growth path if increased wealth enhances individual attitude towards the environment.
The pollution level remains suboptimally high in the transition process and diminishes
until green attitude becomes complete and the negative externality vanishes entirely. Cap-
ital growth may be either suboptimally low or suboptimally high in transition depending
on whether the impact of wealth on green attitude is sufficiently strong.
4.2 Green attitude determined by pollution
In this part we analyse the impact of pollution on green attitude. We focus on the argument
that an increase in the pollution level makes the consequences of economic decisions
on environmental quality more obvious and hence improves green attitude. As regards
the perception function, δ(P), we assume that δP < 0 and δPP > 0, where δ(P0) < 1 and
limP→∞ δ = 0 (compare Figure 3(b)). Additionally, at first we abstract from any impact of
wealth on green attitude, that is δk = ξk = 0.
Pollution then evolves according to
P̂= k̂− ê= k̂− ̂(1−δ(P))− ĉ=
δ
1−δ




Consumption and capital will again grow with the same rate for a utility maximizing time
path as derived in the appendix. Nevertheless, there is a change of the results as regards
the evolution of abatement activity which now also evolves according to this growth rate.
From (25) it is straightforward that the pollution level will be constant if consumption and
capital grow with the same rate. Hence, within the dynamic equilibrium ĉ= k̂ = ê holds
at each point of time. Consequently the economy at once reaches the steady state growth
path without the necessity to pass through a transition process. The growth equilibrium











Equations (26) and (27) suggest that δ(P) can be determined uniquely in equilibrium.
The pollution level depends on green attitude (P= P(δ)) and green attitude depends on
pollution (δ = δ(P)). Since pollution is increasing in the perception parameter, ∂P/∂δ > 0,
and the perception parameter is assumed to depend negatively on the pollution level,
∂δ/∂P < 0, there is a unique and positive solution for equilibrium attitude towards the
environment. Both functions are shown in Figure 6. The equilibrium perception level is
reached instantaneously. Nevertheless one can imagine an adjustment towards the equi-
librium. If the economy starts with less green attitude (higher δ), individuals will take
only a smaller part of influence on the environment into account. The according pollution
level will be higher, thus individuals will recognize their impact on the environment and
green attitude is enhanced (decreasing δ).










Figure 6: Equilibrium attitude towards the environment; parameters ε = 0.05,ρ = 0.05,A= 1.5,γ = 2,ξP =
−1; solid line P(δ) from (27), dashed line δ(P) as assumed
The resulting equilibrium level of pollution will be the lower (and equilibrium green atti-
tude the more pronounced), the stronger environmental preferences (higher γ), the higher
the rate of time preference ρ or the higher capital productivity A. Stronger environmental
preferences imply that dis-utility out of pollution gains importance, hence individuals give
more weight on the environmental implications of their actions and behave more envi-
ronmentally friendly. An increase in the rate of time preference, ρ, will decrease capital
growth. Therefore equilibrium pollution decreases and equilibrium δ increases. An rise in
productivity, A, will increase both capital growth and abatement activity. Equation (A.5)
together with (10) show that the abatement ratio e/k is increasing in capital productivity.
The income effect of increasing productivity on abatement activity dominates the growth
increasing impact. Thus the equilibrium level of pollution decreases.
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As already mentioned, the endogenous evolution of green attitude does not end up in the
optimal growth path if perception is linked exclusively to environmental quality. In equi-
librium, capital and environmental spending grow at identical rates. Then the pollution
level remains unchanged without inducing any further impulses as regards perception.
The economy remains at a suboptimal level and a transition to a sustainable growth path,
as derived in the last section where increasing wealth is accompanied by a more sensitive
environmental perception, may not be derived.
With the underlying simple assumptions the economy will immediately realize the steady
state values of growth and pollution as indicated in (26) and (27). Of course, one can
imagine that in reality green attitude will not adjust immediately. Instead, there will
be a process of strengthening attitude towards the environment. A process where green
attitude reacts on the previous level of pollution and pollution in turn results from the
current environmental awareness could induce a cyclical adjustment process which would
take time. Nevertheless, such phenomena cannot be analysed with the current version of
the model, hence we let them for future research.
4.3 Green attitude determined jointly by wealth and environment
Finally we come back to the general assumption that green attitude is determined by
wealth and by pollution simultaneously, hence δ = δ(k,P) with the assumptions concern-
ing the derivatives imposed above, see (2). Utility maximization again requires equal
growth rates of consumption and capital, thus the consumption ratio c/k remains con-




















The effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution again is reduced by the impact of
wealth on green attitude, ξk, as explained in section 4.1. More interestingly, the impact
of pollution on green attitude now affects equilibrium growth. The impact of pollution on
green attitude, ξP, has both a direct and an indirect effect on capital growth. The direct
impact is growth decreasing: the absolute value of the fraction in the denominator of (28)
decreases, thus the denominator increases and capital growth decreases. The economic
intuition of this direct effect is the following. As wealth increases and environmental ed-
ucation is extended, individuals are more aware of environmental concerns and reduce
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the pollution level. Due to increasing environmental quality, the necessity to behave envi-
ronmentally friendly is less obvious and c. p. individuals care less about the environment.
Capital accumulation increases. But additionally there is an indirect effect of the impact
of pollution on green attitude: the perception parameter δ also is influenced by pollution.
Whether green attitude enhances slower or faster during the transition process depends
on the parameter setting. Consequently the overall effect on capital growth is ambiguous
as shown in figure 7.







(a) small impact of wealth: ξk =−0.2






(b) large impact of wealth: ξk =−0.4
Figure 7: Capital growth in transition; solid red line: k̂(δ(k,P)) from (28) with low pollution P = 1.01,
dashed red line: k̂(δ(k,P)) from (28) with high pollution P= 2.5, solid green line k̂(δ(k)) from (21), dashed
green line k̂∗ from (18); parameters: ε = 0.05,ρ = 0.05,A= 1.5,γ = 2,ξP =−0.5
Figure 7(a) shows that capital growth indeed may increase or decrease due to the addi-
tional impact of pollution on green attitude (red lines) compared with the case that green
attitude is solely driven by wealth (solid green line). The effect predominantly depends
on the current level of pollution. If pollution is high and individuals react on the level of
pollution, green attitude enhances and capital growth decreases (dashed red line). This
is what happened after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Pollution was high and individ-
uals were disposed to change their attitude towards the environment. Hence behaviour
became more environmentally friendly.
If instead pollution is low and individuals’ green attitude reacts on environmental quality,
they get convinced that environmental issues are unproblematic. Environmentally friendly
behaviour becomes less important and capital growth (solid red line) exceeds the growth
rate of an economy where only wealth determines green attitude. This is the approach
of various elderly men in my circle of acquaintances. Since pollution has been reduced
significantly in the last decades they claim not to take environmental concern too serious
within economic decisions.
19
Figure 7(b) captures the more unrealistic case that capital growth is suboptimally low be-
cause the impact of wealth on green attitude is sufficiently large. We already explained in
section 4.1 that the ongoing decrease in effective capital return may lead to suboptimally
low capital accumulation. In this case capital growth increases unambiguously due to the
additional impact of pollution on green attitude, independent from the level of pollution.
Within the transition process environmental quality increases thus reducing the obvious
necessity for environmentally friendly behaviour.
Of course, the system of capital growth, pollution and green attitude is interdependent.
There is not only the described impact of pollution on capital growth, but also an impact
of capital accumulation on the pollution level. Pollution as given by (29) depends on
green attitude, δ, and green attitude is influenced by the capital stock. Thus in all time
increments the resulting pollution level (c. p.) is lower the higher the capital endowment
due to the improvement of green attitude.









Figure 8: Equilibrium attitude towards the environment; parameters ε = 0.05,ρ = 0.05,A= 1.5,γ = 2,ξk =
−0.2,ξP =−0.5; solid red line P(δ) from (29), dashed red line δ(k,P) from (2) with low k (k= 10), dashed
green line δ(k,P) from (2) with high k (k= 100)
The effect of capital endowment on the equilibrium pollution level is unequivocally nega-
tive, as displayed in figure 8. An increase in wealth enhances green attitude (δ decreases)
which results in the shift of the function δ(k,P) to the left. Hence individuals give more
weight on the environmental impact of their activities and reduce the equilbrium pollution
level. The intersection point in figure 8 shifts downwards.
To conclude, the pollution level is decreased by capital accumulation since wealth influ-
ences green attitude positively. Nevertheless, the growth rate of capital may increase or
decrease due to the impact of pollution on green attitude depending predominantly on
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the level of pollution. As demonstrated in figure 7(a), a high (low) pollution level will fos-
ter (hamper) green attitude because individuals are more (less) likely to understand the
environmental consequences of their economic decisions. Thus capital growth decreases
(increases). However slower (faster) capital growth means that environmental education
increases slower (faster). This induces an opposed effect on green attitude: it will enhance
slower (faster). The overall impact on the speed of convergence depends on the concrete
parameter setting.
Anyway, due to ongoing capital growth, green attitude will improve until the perception
parameter vanishes, that is limt→∞ δ = 0. Hence, capital growth converges to the socially
optimal growth rate given in (23), as in the case ξk < 0,ξP = 0 where green attitude is
determined exclusively by wealth. Whether convergence towards the social optimum is
promoted or hindered depends on the parameter setting.
5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the interdependency between green attitude, environmental qual-
ity and economic growth. We understand environmental externalities to be based on the
incomplete perception of individual influences on environmental quality. Hence the de-
terminants of this individual attitude towards the environment are centred, we focus on
the impact of wealth and of pollution on green attitude. Wealth enhances green attitude
because increasing wealth enables environmental education and eases green consump-
tion. Pollution has a positive impact on green attitude because with higher pollution the
environmental consequences of economic decisions become more obvious. We show that
economic growth as well as the level of environmental quality are crucially influenced by
the green attitude as well as by the evolution of green attitude.
Considering the impact of wealth on green attitude we show that both equilibrium growth
rate and equilibrium environmental quality are subject to transitional dynamics. Capital
growth is decreased due to the impact of wealth on green attitude. Within the growth
process wealth increases, allows for more environmental education and improves green
attitude. Hence, individuals are more aware of the consequences of their economic de-
cisions on environmental quality and behave more environmentally friendly. Capital ac-
cumulation is decreased and pollution also decreases. Eventually, as a consequence of
sufficiently high wealth, the individual’s impact on environmental quality is completely
included at the individual optimization calculus. Dynamic market equilibrium converges
to the sustainable growth path.
The sensitivity of dynamics is highlighted by considering that environmental perception
is not affected by individual wealth but is determined by environmental quality itself.
21
For low pollution levels, individuals do not care about the impact of their activity on the
environment. As environmental quality gets worse, we assume a higher sensitivity about
the relationship between individual activity and aggregate pollution. However, given these
assumptions, the aforementioned result of a transition to the sustainable growth path may
not be retained. Instead, the resulting equilibrium is characterized by a constant level of
environmental quality which still is suboptimally low. Due to the impact of pollution
on the individual attitude towards the environment, environmental quality is increased.
Nevertheless equilibrium environmental quality remains constant and will not improve
over time.
If both wealth and pollution jointly determine green attitude, the dynamics of capital
growth and environmental quality influence mutually. A larger wealth endowment uniquely
decreases the resulting pollution level due to the associated improvement of green atti-
tude. A higher pollution level has an ambiguous impact on capital growth depending
predominantly on the level of pollution. In case of high pollution individuals learn about
the relation between their economic decisions and the resulting environmental quality.
Green attitude enhances and pollution as well as capital growth decrease. In case of low
pollution the improvement of green attitude is hampered resulting in an increase in capi-
tal growth. Whether convergence to the optimal growth path is accelerated or decelerated
depends on the specific parameter setting.
Appendix: derivation of transitional dynamics
Transition to the long-run equilibrium is determined by the evolution of the consumption
ratio, c/k, the pollution level, P, and the growth rate of capital, k̂. Inserting (13) within










One can see that the attitude towards the environment will centrally influence the devel-
opment of pollution.
The equilibrium evolution of the consumption ratio ĉ/k= ĉ− k̂ can be calculated from the











such that economic and environmental development are uniquely determined. Using P̂





























































) ≡ µ (A.5)
It is straightforward that the consumption ratio is unstable such that intertemporal utility
maximization implies the choice of the consumption ratio c/k = µ. As a consequence,
throughout the equilibrium transition process growth of both capital and consumption
coincide. The growth rate of capital results as follows
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